The crime of rape — whether simple, qualified, or complexed with other crimes — is difficult to substantiate because it is generally unwitnessed and perpetrated in seclusion. The prosecution of such crime becomes even more intricate if homicide is committed since the victim could no longer testify.[19]
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RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
In rape with homicide, the elements of the component crimes must be established beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
The prosecution must prove that:
(1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim;
(2) carnal knowledge of the victim was achieved by means of force, threat, or intimidation; and
(3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat, or intimidation, the accused killed the victim.[21]
Notably, Milo conceded during trial that he killed AAA227396 but disavowed criminal liability since it was supposedly accidental.
Milo alleged that he unconsciously boxed AAA227396 on the chest after she abruptly awakened him. The argument is specious.
The Revised Penal Code (RPC) is explicit that
"[a]ny person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it" is exempted from criminal liability.[22]
The exempting circumstance of "accident" is anchored on the complete absence of intent or negligence on the part of the accused. In other words, the accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act.[23]
Moreover, accident is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to establish with clear and convincing proof. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.
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ACCIDENT AS AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the essential requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance, namely:
(1) a person is performing a lawful act;
(2) with due care;
(3) he/she causes an injury to another by mere accident; and
(4) without fault or intention of causing it.[24]
In this case, the exempting circumstance of accident is inapplicable. Foremost, accident presupposes that the act done is lawful.
However, Milo's act of boxing AAA227396 on the chest is unlawful, constituting at least the felony of physical injuries.[25]
Further the evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, (a) in the means used by the malefactors, (b) the nature, (c) location, and (d) number of wounds sustained by the victim.
The intent to kill is presumed if the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors.[26]
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Here, AAA227396 died due to asphyxia by suffocation and was found underneath Milo's bed with a cloth wrapped around her mouth and nose, and with both hands tied and twisted at her back.
Worse, AAA227396 suffered a total of 33 injuries and abrasions on different parts of her body. Inarguably, the autopsy report loudly speaks against Milo's alleged lack of intent.
The report corroborates the fact that these injuries could not have been inflicted without the accused having placed himself in control of his victim.
The report also supports the conclusion that the injuries were inflicted to repel any resistance that the victim may offer the accused.
As the examining physician testified, the rope marks found on the forehead of the victim was meant to prevent her from fighting the accused.
The abrasions might have been caused by hitting or striking the victim's body with a hard object such as a piece of wood or fist blows. The asphyxia was a result of covering or wrapping the mouth and nasal orifice with a cloth or exerting pressure by the use of human hands or any other means.[27]
Assuming there was no evil intent, the hard facts indicate that Milo acted without due care and prudence as regards the circumstances before him.
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Milo’s supposed unconscious punching of the victim amounts to a negligent act absent evidence that he was totally deprived of his powers of observation and mental faculties.
The Court cannot accept Milo's kind of tale which is highly contrary to common human experience. Obviously, it is preposterous to believe that the initial reaction of person who was suddenly awakened is to indiscriminately throw punches.
It is a legal truism that evidence to be considered must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.[28] Taken together, the defense of accident must be struck down.
Milo failed to adduce any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility other than his bare claim that the killing was accidental.
Anent the component crime of rape, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that sufficient circumstantial evidence eloquently show that Milo sexually assaulted AAA227396 before killing her.
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CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; CRIMINAL CASES
In the prosecution of criminal offenders, conviction is not always based on direct evidence. The Rules of Court allows resort to circumstantial evidence provided the following conditions are satisfied, to wit:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[29]
The Court explained that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, compatible with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and in conflict with the notion that he is innocent.[30]
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Here, none of the prosecution witnesses testified having seen Milo rape AAA227396. Yet, the corpus of circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of events pointing to Milo's guilt.
As the CA aptly observed, AAA227396 went to Milo's house and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body the following day in the same place.
The medical examination revealed that AAA227396 sustained hymenal lacerations at the 3 o'clock position. The lacerations were due to the insertion of a blunt object like a human penis or any hard item.
Also, dried blood was found on AAA227396's labia majora which is a strong evidence that she was raped. The most incriminating evidence against Milo is when AAA227396's body was found underneath his bed.
This forecloses a host of possibilities that a person, other than Milo, raped and killed AAA227396. These proven facts, when weaved together, lead to no other conclusion but of Milo's culpability for the crime.
To be sure, the Court upheld the conviction for rape with homicide where the accused was positively identified to be the last person seen with the victim on or about the time she was killed at the place where the she was found dead. The victim had no reason to be afraid of the accused and had no premonition of evil when she went with him.[31]
Finally, Milo's defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the circumstantial evidence. These negative defenses are self-serving and undeserving of weight in law absent clear and convincing proof.[32]
We stress that the CA and the RTC's assessment on the credibility of the witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies are given the highest degree of respect,[33] especially if there is no fact or circumstance of weight or substance that was overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, which could affect the result of the case.[34]
The prosecution witnesses harbored no ill motive to falsely testify against Milo.[35] In any event, Milo did not adduce evidence that lie was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[36] Admittedly, the accused and the victim were in the same house at the time the crime was committed.
As to Milo's criminal liability, the special complex crime of rape with homicide carries the penalty of death.[37] In view of Republic Act No. 9346,[38] however, the Court is mandated to impose on Milo the penalty of reclusion perpetua with qualification that he is not eligible for parole.[39] As to Milo's civil liability, the CA and the RTC properly awarded PHP 100,000.00 as civil indemnity. However, the Court deems it proper to increase the moral damages and exemplary damages to PHP 100,000.00 each pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. The Court also finds it appropriate to grant temperate damages of PHP 50,000.00 considering that no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses was submitted in court.[40] Lastly, all the monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment.[41]
On this point, the Court reminds that it will not flinch in sending callous persons rapacious of the flesh to the gallows especially those who commit unimaginable acts and even concoct tales, no matter how absurd, just to exculpate themselves.[42]
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated September 15, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 06148 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant Milo Leocadio y Labrador (Milo) is found GUILTY of rape with homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Milo is also DIRECTED to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of PHP 100,000.00 as civil indemnity, PHP 100,000.00 as moral damages, PHP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and PHP 50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
FOOTNOTES
[19] People v. Robles, Jr., 364 Phil. 752, 763 (1999) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[20] People v. Diño, 46 Phil. 395, 399-400 (1924) [Per J. Villamor, Second Division].
[21] People v. Narzabal, 647 Phil. 299, 308 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc], citing People v. Nanas, 415 Phil. 683, 696 (2001) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
[22] See paragraph 4, Article 12 of the RPC.
[23] People v. Malicdem, 698 Phil. 408, 419-420 (2012) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
[24] Toledo v. People, 482 Phil. 292, 303 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]. See also People v. Castillo, 553 Phil. 197, 207-208 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division].
[25] People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., 358 Phil. 942, 950 (1998) [Per J. Melo, Second Division].
[26] People v. Latosa, 635 Phil. 555, 565 (2010) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division].
[27] CA rollo, pp. 49-50.
[28] People v. Baquiran, 126 Phil. 807, 810 (1967) [Per J. Castro, En Banc]. See also People v. Magpantay, 348 Phil. 107, 114-115 (1998) [Per J. Melo, Third Division].
[29] See Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
[30] People v. Geron, 346 Phil. 14, 24 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Third Division]. See also People v. Dela Cruz, 397 Phil. 401, 420 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[31] People v. Develles, 284 Phil. 210, 216 (1992) [Per J. Griño-Aquino, First Division]. See also People v. Quisay, 378 Phil. 193, 220 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
[32] People v. Togahan, 5514 Phil. 997, 1013-1014 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
[33] People v. Matignas, 428 Phil. 834, 868-869 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc], citing People v. Basquez, 481 Phil. 426, 439 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], People v. Jaberto, 366 Phil. 556, 566 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], and People v. Deleverio, 352 Phil. 382, 401 (1998) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
[34] People v. Orosco, 757 Phil. 299, 310 (2015) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division], citing People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 721 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[35] People v. Abierra, 833 Phil. 276, 289-290 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[36] People v. Espina, 383 Phil. 656, 668 (2000) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division], citing People v. Francisco, 373 Phil. 733, 747 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division]; People v. Baniel, 341 Phil. 471, 481 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division]; People v. Patawaran, 340 Phil. 259, 266 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division]; and People v. Henson, 337 Phil. 318, 324 (1997) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
[37] See paragraph 4, Article 266-B of the RPC.
[38] Entitled "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES," approved on June 24, 2006.
[39] See A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, entitled "GUIDELINES FOR THE PROPER USE OF THE PHRASE 'WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE' IN INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES," approved on August 4, 2015.
[40] People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 846-847 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
[41] Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 282-283 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
[42] People v. Abulencia, 415 Phil. 731, 735 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: September 04, 2023
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