The Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitutional prohibition on the appointment to government positions within one year from the election applies to all losing candidates, regardless of the position and the place or jurisdiction of the office where they are appointed.
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In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez, the Supreme Court En Banc denied the petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court filed by Raul F. Macalino (Macalino). The petition challenged the rulings of the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowing the payment of Macalino’s wages and allowances as Legal Officer II of the Municipal Government of Mexico, Pampanga.
Macalino ran and lost as vice mayor of San Fernando City, Pampanga in the May 2013 elections. On July 1, 2013, he entered into a contract of service with the Municipal Government of Mexico, Pampanga, through then Mayor Roy D. Manalastas. Under the contract of service, Macalino was to perform the duties of a Legal Officer II from June 1, 2013 to July 30, 2014 with a salary of PHP 26,125 per month.
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In 2014, a Notice of Disallowance was issued by the Office of the Audit Team Leader disallowing the wages and Personal Economic Relief Assistance received by Macalino for having been paid to a losing candidate in the May 2013 elections, in violation of the prohibition under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (LGC). Macalino and the approving and certifying officers were held liable for the return of the total disallowed amount of PHP 149,015.
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The COA Proper affirmed the disallowance, hence Macalino’s recourse to the Court.
In denying Macalino’s petition, the Court stressed that Article IX-B, Section 6 of the Constitution is clear that those who lost in the election are prohibited from being appointed to any government position within one year of such election.
Section 94(b) of the LGC likewise states that except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election, within one year after such election, shall be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) or in any of their subsidiaries.
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The Court added that such prohibition is “a recognition of political will—it means that the people rejected the losing candidate and did not want him or her to occupy a public office. Thus, the electorate’s volition will be flouted if a candidate is immediately appointed to an office in the government after losing an election bid.”
The Court also rejected Macalino’s arguments that (1) the prohibition does not apply to contracts of service and (2) there was no violation because he was appointed as Legal Officer II in Mexico, Pampanga, and not in San Fernando City, Pampanga, where he ran and lost as vice mayor.
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The Court stressed that both the Constitution and the LGC explicitly use the phrase
“any office in the Government or any [GOCCs] or in any of their subsidiaries.”
“Basic is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish…Courts are tasked only with interpreting the law; it cannot read into the law what is not written therein,”
the Court held.
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The Court thus ruled that Macalino cannot disregard the one-year prohibition by asserting that his appointment was not of a permanent nature, but rather under a contract of service that did not require the taking of an oath office, and that such appointment was made in a different jurisdiction.
“Such an argument is ludicrous, as it contradicts the clear and unambiguous provisions of both the Constitution and the LGC,”
stressed the Court.
“To interpret the prohibition selectively or to allow exceptions based on different interpretations that would allow a losing candidate to be appointed would open the door to potential abuses,”
the Court ruled.
The Court thus concluded that the subject prohibition applies to all losing candidates regardless of the position and the place or jurisdiction of the office in which they will be appointed.
The Court also noted other irregularities in Macalino’s appointment, such as how his functions under the contract of service were similar to the duties of a regular plantilla Legal Officer of a local government unit (LGU), in violation of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 020790, which prohibits personnel from being hired to a vacant regular plantilla position under a contract of service and job order.
Macalino’s appointment also violated COA Circular No. 98-002, dated June 9, 1998, which prohibits LGUs from using public funds to pay for the services of a private lawyer or a law firm, except under extraordinary and exceptional circumstances, and with the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel as well as the written concurrence of the COA.
In Macalino’s case, there is no showing that such requirements were complied with.
As to Macalino’s liability, the Court applied the guidelines laid down in the 2020 case of Torreta v. Commission on Audit, which apply to the return of disallowed amounts in cases involving unlawful/irregular government contracts.
Under the said guidelines, approving and certifying officers who acted in bad faith are solidarily liable with the recipients for the return of the disallowed amount.
However, the civil liability may be reduced by the amounts due to the recipient on considerations of fairness and the equitable principle of unjust enrichment. Thus, recipients of amounts paid under unlawful or irregular government contracts may still be allowed to recover a reasonable value of the thing delivered or the service rendered when proper and depending on the circumstances of each case, in accordance with the principle of quantum meruit.
In the present case, the approving and certifying officers of the Municipal Government of Mexico, Pampanga were found solidarily liable with Macalino. However, records do not show that the said officers appealed the COA’s findings; hence, the COA’s ruling on their liability stands.
As to Macalino, the Court held that the principle of quantum meruit cannot be applied to reduce his liability as his appointment indicates a
“blatant circumvention of a basic constitutional prohibition which any lawyer should know.”
The Court thus clarified that the adoption of the quantum meruit principle in Torreta v. Commission on Audit was
“never intended to sanction manifest or palpable violations of law, especially those under the Constitution or those which involve clear public policy. Indeed, case law bears that the principle of quantum meruit operates as an equitable device to prevent the government’s unjust enrichment at the expense of innocent parties, who will otherwise suffer monetary loss with the rigid application of technical rules or insignificant legal requirements.”
Courtesy of the Supreme Court Public Information Office
FULL TEXT of G.R. No. 253199, Raul F. Macalino v. Commission on Audit (November 14, 2023), at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/253199-raul-f-macalino-vs-commission-on-audit/
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