Oct 13, 202336 min read

Q. No. 14 | Political Law | Bar 2023 | Suggested Answer

Updated: Oct 14, 2023

Q. No. 14 | Political Law | Bar 2023

Lorenzo was re-elected as Mayor of Roxas City for his third consecutive term in the 2022 local elections. In 2023, Lorenzo was administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) for acts committed during his second term. Lorenzo moved to dismiss the complaint before the OMB on the ground that his re-election to a third term effectively exonerated him from the administrative charge pursuant to the condonation doctrine. Is Lorenzo correct? Explain briefly.

SUGGESTED ANSWER

RE: Preliminary

In this case, the basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.

The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA[234] (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively charged."[235] Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"[236] during the pendency of the proceedings.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos[237] The CA held that

Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.[238] Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e., the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,[239] corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[240] and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,[241] wherein the condonation doctrine was applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.[242]

With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.

RE: The origin of the condonation doctrine.

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense."[246]

The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,[247] (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no established weight of authority in the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.[250] The Ombudsman aptly cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced

Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US on the condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been proper.

At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of interpretation."[267] Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine.

RE: The stare decisis rule

As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against its application.[268] In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent.[269] As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it thrives.[270] In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide."[271]

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.

RE: Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).

The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.[272]

Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.[273] (emphasis supplied)

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:

As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.[274]

RE: The Court undertakes an examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to justify its March 16, 2015, and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs - would show that the basis for condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts off the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service."[287] Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."[288] Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

In Belgica, it was explained that:

[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability x x x.[289] (Emphasis supplied)

The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission,[290] and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.[291]

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,[292] otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992.

Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

RE: Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos[293] to apply to administrative offenses:

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v. Thompson[300] and Montgomery v. Novell[301] both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.

RE: No abdication of electorate’s WILL; The condonation doctrine has no basis in law and jurisprudence

Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.

RE: There could be no condonation of an act that is unknown.

Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has no knowledge.

At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.[302] Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.303 (Ombudsman Morales vs. CA & Binay, Jr., Citing Walsh v. City Council of Trenton).

TAKE NOTE:

RE: Prospective Applicability of this doctrine

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.[305] Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation.

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.[307]

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal,[308] wherein it was ruled:

[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,[309] it was further elaborated:

[P]ursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional.[310]

EN BANC

[ G.R. Nos. 217126-27. November 10, 2015 ]

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., RESPONDENTS.

Read the full text at

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61377

FOOTNOTES

RELATED DOCTRINES

RE: Both petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65; Remedies of last resort; that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[110]

Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency, x x x."[111]

EXCEPTIONS

In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.[112] These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.[113]

TAKE NOTE;

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since,

for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore.
This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution.
Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative liability.
As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is justified.

RE: Validity of the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts,[136] and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desierto[137] (Fabian).[138]

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770[142] - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence,[143] it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing,[144] Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they "cover the same specific or particular subject matter,"[145] that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

NOTE:

RE: General Rule; the Court will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings |

A challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment.

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.[147]

RE: Doctrine of hierarchy of courts

In People v. Cuaresma,[188] the doctrine was explained as follows:

[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.

RE: Judicial Power

When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.

Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."[190] Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

RE: The expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution

In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.[191] the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.[192]

RE: The power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more independent judiciary."[199]

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. As pronounced in Echegaray:

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.[202]

RE: Temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action.

A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo[203] until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit.[204] In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.

The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law[208] or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.

RE: The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction.

In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,[209] which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"[210] over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,"[211] the Court ruled that said power "should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter:"[212]

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ; will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.[213]

In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:

[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.[214]

In Smothers v. Lewis[217] (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal,[218] the Supreme Court of Kentucky held:

[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power and the judicial power to be one and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by the constitution carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration of justice."

NOTE: Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power, and to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally impermissible:

It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once and for all make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.

The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within the purview of the legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial power may be or may not be granted or denied[.]

Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it could control the appellate judicial proceeding:

However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally granted powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal arises the legislature is void of any right to control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and have preempted the field.[219]

RE: The Unconstitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 |

With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing right[220] since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,[221] it was stated that:

If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;[222] (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees;[223] and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes[224] While these cases involved legislative enactments exempting government owned and controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure[225] solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional independence."[226]

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,[227] because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.

RE: Constitution; Fundamental Law of the Land

In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,[229] the Court instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.[230]

RE: first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770); Ineffective Until adopted by the Supreme Court

However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.

RE: Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,[231] the Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:

Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.

RE: suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.

Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. (Emphasis supplied)

Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:

Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.[232]

RE: WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued; No Grave Abuse of Discretion

As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[311] It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."[312]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor;

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES:

[199] Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes, 627 P hil. 543,549(2010).

[202] Supra note 195, at 88.

[203] "Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy." (See Dolmar Real Estate Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 570 Phil. 434, 439 [2008] and Preysler, Jr. v. CA, 527 Phil. 129, 136 [2006].)