RE: There could be no condonation of an act that is unknown.
Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on the theory of condonation.
We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has no knowledge.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.
At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. (Ombudsman Morales vs. CA & Binay, Jr., Citing Walsh v. City Council of Trenton)
📎 Bio: https://pxl.to/772wt1b
🛒 Shop: https://shopple.co/Lex-curiae
⚖️ Blog : https://pxl.to/ATTYPhilJuris
🤝 Business: https://invol.co/cljxjwq
Comments