top of page
Writer's pictureATTY. PHIL JURIS

DEDICATORIA vs. DEDICATORIA, G.R. No. 250618. July 20, 2022


Psychological incapacity as a ground to consider a marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code, is not a medical, but a legal concept. Application of rigid medical parameters for its determination is, thus, ill-suited. Expert opinions furnished by psychiatrists or psychologists on the psychological temperament of parties are not indispensable.[1] It is enough that the totality of clear and convincing evidence proves that an enduring aspect of a spouse's personality, existing at the time of the celebration of marriage, render him or her incapable of understanding or performing essential marital obligations.[2]


The petition basically impels the Court to re-evaluate the pieces of evidence and resolve if they are sufficient to declare the marriage void ab initio due to Ferdinand's psychological incapacity. Ordinarily, it is not within the purview of a Rule 45 petition to review the correctness of the lower court's appreciation of evidence. This Court is not a trier of facts and, therefore, is generally bound by the findings of fact of the CA. But this case falls under the exceptions to such rule, to wit:


(1) "when [the factual] findings of the [RTC and the CA] are conflicting;" and (2) "[t]he [CA's] finding of fact x x x is premised on the supposed absence of evidence [but] is contradicted by the evidence on record"[24] as discussed below. Hence, the case deserves a second hard look.



Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring a marriage void


Jennifer's cause of action is grounded upon Article 36 of the Family Code, which states:


ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.



In the recent case of Tan-Andal v. Andal,[25] the Court settled the varying guidelines in determining the existence of psychological incapacity as a ground to declare a marriage void. Foremost, the psychological incapacity must have juridical antecedence as required in Molina because Article 36 explicitly requires it to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Tan-Andal, however, clarified that such requirement does not require proof that the psychological incapacity roots from a medically-identified mental incapacity or psychological incapacity as previously required in Molina. Psychological incapacity has always been a legal concept — it is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder in a strict medical sense, although one's clinical mental or personality disorder can be its root cause.[26]


As contemplated under the law, psychological incapacity plainly depicts an enduring aspect of a spouse's personality structure, existing at the time of the celebration of marriage, that render [them] incapable of understanding and complying with [their] essential marital obligations, manifested through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family.[27] In other words, the law does not require a clinical diagnosis of a mental or personality disorder to obtain a decree of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. "A psychologically incapacitated [spouse] need not be shamed and pathologized for what could have been a simple mistake in one's choice of intimate partner x x x."[28] 



The respondent-spouse's childhood development need not be probed into to prove juridical antecedence of [their] alleged psychological incapacity,[29] thus:


Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations.


In this way, the Code Committee's intent to limit the incapacity to "psychic causes" is fulfilled. Furthermore, there will be no need to label a person as having a mental disorder just to obtain a decree of nullity. x x x. A person's psychological incapacity to fulfill [their] marital obligations should not be at the expense of one's dignity, because it could very well be that [they] she did not know that the incapacity existed in the first place.

x x x x


[P]roof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior. For instance, violence against one's spouse and children can be a manifestation of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity when it is shown that a violent spouse grew up with domestic violence or had a history of abusive romantic relationships before the marriage.[30] (Emphases supplied)


The psychological incapacity must also be grave to distinguish it from "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts"[31] generally brought about by human nature and the natural dynamics of every personal relationship.


Finally, the psychological incapacity must be incurable, but unlike in Molina, such incurability should not be confused with medical or clinical permanence. Rather, the psychological incapacity must be incurable in the legal sense, meaning:


[T]he incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. "[A]n undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."[32] (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)


Thus, on the premise that psychological incapacity is a legal, not a medical concept, it is inapt to focus on rigid medical parameters to prove its juridical antecedence, incurability and gravity. Instead, the totality of clear and convincing evidence must be considered to determine that the essential requisites of the incapacity are satisfied.


The question, therefore, is whether the totality of evidence presented in this case — the testimonies of Jennifer, Anarose, and clinical psychologist Montefalcon — is sufficient to sustain a finding that Ferdinand is psychologically incapacitated.


We also quote with approval the RTC's ruling on this aspect, viz.:


Gravity — x x x having been afflicted with a personality disorder characterized as Dependent Personality Disorder[,] [Ferdinand] is unable to assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect[,] and fidelity[,] and rendering help and support, for he is inept to make ordinary and every day decisions. Fittingly established by the clinical psychologist, [his] psychological disorder i[s] manifested by his difficulty in making everyday decisions without excessive amount of advice and reassurance from others[.] x x x [I]t is difficult for him to move out from his parents because his family[,] especially his mother[,] needs him; and for a long time[,] they had relied [on] each other in almost all aspects of their decision[-]making then all of a sudden things would change radically. x x x; [He] was upset that [Jennifer] is not like his mother who treats him like a baby or who takes care of him extra-ordinarily. He wanted [his wife] to assume responsibilities the way his mother behaves as a wife and mother. x x x; [H]e could not defend his wife from the outburst of his family members because he fears that he might lose support from his attachment figures (his family especially his mother). x x x; [He] prefers to live at his parents' house because he became too dependent on his family's support and presence. Without the reassurance from his parents, it is difficult for him to do things on his own. He has no intention to look for a job[,] not because [he] lack[s] motivation[,] but [due to] lack of self-esteem brought about by his childish disposition. He goes to excessive lengths to obtain nurturance and support from others, to the point of volunteering to do things that are unpleasant; x x x, [he] even brought his wife [to] his brother's house who is also a family man without thinking that it would be very unpleasant just so he could stay with his brother x x x. When [his wife and son left to make him realize their importance,] (x x x), he immediately looked for another woman (girlfriend) instead [of settling] their problems. Dependent persons are most likely to find another attachment figure when they feel threatened that they are losing one. x x x.

x x x x


[Ferdinand,] by continuously engaging [himself] in a carefree lifestyle such as being over dependent on his parent, patent irresponsibility and immaturity, [manifests] an obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time he made his marital vows. x x x.[53] (Emphases and italization in the original)

Incurability.


As well, we agree with the RTC's conclusion that the incurability requisite was satisfied:


Incurability — x x x [Ferdinand's] psychological disorder is incurable x x x because his family traits is deeply rooted and already embedded in his psyche. As aptly stated by the expert witness, x x x, it is gleaned that [Ferdinand's] psychological disorder x x x is permanent, chronic and pervasive affecting many aspects of his life such as social, functioning and close relationships. He just cannot perform his duties x x x as husband, as he entered into marriage for his own self-satisfaction and gratification, x x x. He failed to render mutual love, respect, help, support and fidelity (Article 68, FC). Additionally, it also speaks of INCURABILITY, as he has no psychological insight that he has character problem. He would not acknowledge the pain he caused to people around him. x x x. He has poor ego integration that caused him the failure to understand the important tenets of marriage that is directed toward that solidarity and formation of family.[54] (Emphases, italization, and underscoring in the original)

Contrary to the CA's ruling, the incapacity need not be "rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness"[55] to be incurable. We stress psychological incapacity does not need to be a medical or clinical condition. The witnesses' attestations as to Ferdinand's incorrigible personality towards Jennifer and their child sufficiently established Ferdinand's persistent failure to understand and fulfill his marital and parental obligations, inevitably resulting in the breakdown of their marriage. Moreover, apart from the finding that Ferdinand's traits are deeply-ingrained in his personality structure, the fact that Ferdinand has been estranged and physically living separately from Jennifer for more than 15 years at present is demonstrative of an incurable incapacity to comprehend and assume his responsibilities in the marriage. Taken together with the established facts, it is also indicative of the irreparable reluctance of the spouses to accept the other, which is indispensable to the marital relationship.[56]



In all, the totality of evidence presented, comprising of Montefalcon's psychological report, and the testimonies of Jennifer and Anarose, sufficiently prove Ferdinand's psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code, warranting the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Jennifer. At this point, we find it apt to echo our final word in Quilpan:


It is cases like these that the law contemplates a situation where a spouse's psychic causes destroy a marriage. Corollary to this Court's Constitutional duty to value the sanctity of marriage is Our duty to ensure that only marriages that establish conjugal and family life are maintained. That marriage is an inviolable social institution does not mean that a spouse who unwittingly marries an individual with a certain level of "dysfunctionality that show[s] a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes" is condemned to a life sentence of misery. There are more than enough jokes about the pitfalls of marriage. In the most serious of cases such as this, the Court steps in to ensure that the sanctity of marriage is maintained — not derided.[57] (Emphasis supplied and citation omitted)




To be sure, the time-honored spiel "until death do us part" is not a blind vow of eternal condemnation for worse but a simple pledge of faithful observance by the spouses of their utter commitment of mutual love, respect, support, and fidelity. Any complicity to breach their essential duties borne by dysfunctionality will not justify their continued union lest the inviolability of marriage as an institution will falter to perdition, betraying the constitutionally-enshrined purpose of sustaining the family as a basic social institution.




FOOTNOTES



SUGGESTED READINGS:





FOLLOW US!


❤️ SUPPORT 

⚖️ BLOG

🛒 SHOP


167 views0 comments

Comentários

Avaliado com 0 de 5 estrelas.
Ainda sem avaliações

Adicione uma avaliação
Get In Touch
bottom of page