RE: Judicial courtesy is not a ground for the issuance of a WPI.
Brief statement of facts:
The CA found that Meridien's cause of action was hinged upon its CEZA-issued license to operate jai alai, which the Joint Memorandum allegedly violated. As CEZA's authority to grant the license to operate jai alai activities was then in question before the Court in G.R. No. 194962,[39] the CA opined that its ruling might render the related issue in G.R. No. 194962 moot. Hence, as judicial courtesy, the CA issued a WPI to provisionally restrain the implementation of the Joint Memorandum, and await the Court's resolution in G.R. No. 194962 before resolving the principal action in CA-G.R. SP No. 120236.
The CA was in error.
We emphasize that G.R. No. 194962, which was the basis of the CA in suspending the disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 120236, was already disposed in 2016. The Court ordered the CA to give due course to CEZA's mandamus on appeal, wherein the issue on CEZA's authority to grant license to operate jai alai activities must be resolved.[40] Accordingly, the CA should have LIFTED motu proprio the questioned WPI, and proceeded to resolve the main issues in CA-G.R. SP No. 120236.[41] Also, we could have conveniently dismissed this Petition on the ground of mootness. But the grave error committed by the CA in issuing the WPI constrains us to resolve the substantive issues raised in this Petition to clarify and put into perspective the dichotomy of judicial courtesy and the issuance of WPI.
Over the years, we have unswervingly qualified and limited the application of the principle of judicial courtesy on cases that would render the issues before the higher court moot.[42] Its exercise is always considered to be the exception rather than the rule.[43] In Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club,[44] we gave a brief discourse on the doctrine of judicial courtesy:
Under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the higher court should issue against the public respondent a [TRO] or a [WPI] in order to interrupt the course of the principal case. The petitioner in a Rule 65 petition has the burden of proof to show that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of an injunctive writ or order to suspend the proceedings before the public respondent. He should show the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ or order, so that serious damage may be prevented. Nonetheless[,] even if an injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court retains jurisdiction over the principal case.
Indeed, we introduced in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals the principle of judicial courtesy to justify the suspension of the proceedings before the lower court even without an injunctive writ or order from the higher court. In that case, we pronounced that "[d]ue respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition [for certiorari] before taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this [C]ourt." We subsequently reiterated the concept of judicial courtesy in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals.
Remedial Law: Excerpts of the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (2022) by Mogello
We however, have qualified and limited the application of judicial courtesy in Go v. Abrogar and Republic v. Sandiganbayan. In these cases, we expressly delimited the application of judicial courtesy to maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and held that the principle of judicial courtesy applies only
"if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court."
Through these cases, we clarified that the principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule.[45] (Citations omitted).
Here, contrary to the CA's viewpoint, the resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 120236 could not have mooted or preempted the disposition in G.R. No. 194962. The issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 120236 involves the validity of the Joint Memorandum that was issued based on Section 5 of RA No. 954,[46] which expressly prohibits and penalizes any "person, operator, or [even a] maintainer of a fronton with legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota games (Jai Alai) [to] offer take or arrange bets on any basque pelota game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or gamble or any basque pelota game or event outside the place, enclosure, or fronton where the basque pelota game is held." It was intended to be implemented regardless of the existence and/or legality of Meridien's CEZA-given license.[47] Thus, any ruling on the propriety of the issuance of the Joint Memorandum could not have affected any disposition on CEZA's authority to grant a license to operate jai alai activities then raised in G.R. No. 194962. Since the issues in these pending cases are not related, the CA's adherence to the principle of judicial courtesy was plainly improper.
We must emphasize, at this point, that judicial courtesy is neither a substitute nor a ground for the issuance of a WPI under the Rules. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules provides that a preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
On all these grounds, the existence of a clear and unmistakable legal right is invariably necessary. This paramount consideration differentiates mere exercise of judicial courtesy from the issuance of a WPI, albeit both are essentially for purposes of maintaining status quo between the parties until the merits of the main suit are fully heard.
Judicial courtesy is exercised by suspending the proceedings before a lower court, even without an injunction or an order to that effect from a higher court, to avoid. mooting the matter raised before the higher court. Such exercise is merely as a matter of respect and practical considerations.[48] Whereas, the issuance of a WPI, although it also preserves the status quo, does not suspend the proceedings in the main case. It only prevents the threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the party who has a clear legal right, entitled to be judicially protected during the pendency of the main case. Courts are consistently reminded that the power to issue the writ
"should be exercised sparingly, with the utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation."
[49] A WPI may be issued only upon showing of a clear and positive right calling for judicial protection during the pendency of the principal action.
RE: APPLICATION
In this case, the CA failed to take into account that Meridien does not have an existing clear legal right or even an ostensible right to continue with its off-fronton operations enjoined by the questioned Joint Memorandum. CEZA itself had revoked the authority it granted to Meridien, and directed Meridien to stop all its gaming operations upon being apprised by the OGCC that it was not empowered to authorize, license, operate, and regulate jai alai in the absence of an express legislative franchise.[50] Meridien merely anchors its right to continue its jai alai activities on the RTC-issued writ of mandamus. However, such writ was issued only
"to allow [Meridien] to continue with its gaming operations in accordance with the license granted."
[51] Under the CEZA-given license, Meridien was allowed to engage in gaming operations only to such extent "as may be allowed by law."[52] In other words, Meridien's right is limited by regulatory laws. Since the Joint Memorandum is based upon a law (RA No. 954) that expressly prohibits and penalizes off-fronton operations, it is clear that the writ of mandamus did not give Meridien a right in esse, or at least an ostensible legal right, to operate jai alai activities outside the CSEZFP. To be sure, RA No. 954 enjoys the presumption of validity until declared void by the court,[53] and is thus a legitimate restraint against Meridien's off-fronton operations.
As well, at the time of the issuance of the WPI, there was an existing GAB-issued CDO against Meridien's off-frontons, which the CA upheld in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 119842.[54] While such case is at present under our review in G.R. No. 206118, no question was raised regarding the effectivity of the CDO insofar as off-frontons are concerned. Verily, Meridien has no clear or ostensible legal right to operate jai alai activities outside the CSEZFP to warrant the injunctive relief sought.
RE: Rule 65, Nature of
We stress that CA-G.R. SP No. 119842 was not an appeal from the RTC, but an original action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65,[62] specifically designed to correct errors of jurisdiction only[63] to prevent encroachment, excess, usurpation, or assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or quasi-judicial tribunal.[64] Being an original action limited to deal with jurisdictional issues, there is no judgment on the merits to review, reverse, or modify,[65] unlike in an appeal, wherein the merits of a judgment, award, or final order are the issues being adjudicated.[66]
In the case of Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[67] the Court emphatically ruled that the writs cannot be used for any other purpose as its function is limited to keeping the lower court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, a scrutiny of the merits of the case before the lower court or tribunal is proper only on appeal,[68] not on Rule 65 proceedings.
FOOTNOTES
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