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Writer's pictureATTY. PHIL JURIS

Civil Law | Q No. 1 | Bar 2023

Updated: Oct 17, 2023


Q:Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.


On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated to petitioner for any financial support


Resolve with reason.


Suggested Answer:


On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.


The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.


The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.


In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel, the Court held that –


Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).


It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.


In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.



It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, has already enunciated that:


True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.


In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.


Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.


We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:


In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.


Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.


Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.


The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.




If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48


Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.


We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:


As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:


To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50


Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son,


to wit:


SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:


x x x x


(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:


x x x x


(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x


(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51


Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of violence against women and children.


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