"Appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in accordance with law. A party who seeks to avail of the privilege must comply with the requirements of the rules lest the right to appeal is invariably lost. The Court cannot tolerate ignorance of the law on appeals and it is not our task to determine for litigants their proper remedies under the rules."
(CitingIndoyon. Jr. v. CA, 706 Phil. 200, 212 (2013) [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].
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Under the Rules of Court, there are three modes of appeal from RTC decisions. The first mode is through an ordinary appeal before the CA under Rule 41 where the decision assailed was rendered in the exercise of the RTC's original jurisdiction. In ordinary appeals questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law may be raised.[27] The second mode is through a petition for review before the CA under Rule 42 where the decision assailed was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In petitions for review, questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law may be raised.[28] The third mode is through an appeal by certiorari before this Court under Rule 45 where only questions of law shall be raised,[29]
Corollarily, an improper appeal before the CA is dismissed outright and shall not be referred to the proper court,[30]
The Court agrees with the CA that the SRA availed of the wrong mode of appeal. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to the applicable law and jurisprudence on a certain set of facts. It must not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence. On the other hand, a question of fact exists when there is controversy as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[31]
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A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if the issues require an examination of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. The test, therefore, is not the appellation given to the question by the party raising it, but whether the appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.[32]
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Here, the SRA raised pure questions of law in its appeal. In a petition for declaratory relief, the only issue that may be raised is the construction or validity of the provisions in statute, deed, or contract.[33] The purpose is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance.[34] In this case, Central Azucarera claimed that the SRA has no authority to allocate a class of sugar to ethanol producers. The RTC declared void the allocation and ruled that DOE has regulatory jurisdiction over ethanol producers. The SRA then appealed the RTC's findings to the CA. Verily, the question whether the SRA's Orders are ultra vires or beyond its authority is a question of law. This is because jurisdiction of an administrative agency is a matter of law, to wit:
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law, and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. Only a statute can confer Jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot.[35]
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More importantly, whether the RTC's conclusion in applying the law on jurisdiction is accurate is also a question of law.[36] Undaunted, the SRA insisted that its appeal before the CA involved factual issues on whether Central Azucarera is a real party-in-interest and whether the case is already moot after the amendment on the sugar allocation. The argument is specious. Contrary to the SRA's theory, whether a litigant is a real party-in-interest is another question of law.
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Moreover, the trial court declared that the Bank was not the real party-in-interest to institute the action — another question of law.
In this regard, a reading of the Complaint reveals that the Bank is not actually the real party-in-interest, since Alvin and Francisco were the ones who would stand to be benefitted or injured by the debiting of their respective deposits without their consent, as well as the issuance and subsequent denial of the demand to collect from the supposed spurious FEFCs. In relation to this, Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 2. Parties in Interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.The Bank did not comply with the aforementioned provision when it filed the instant Complaint.[37] (Emphasis supplied)To be sure, the SRA's issue is more geared towards the application of the law on civil procedure and civil law rather than simply identifying specific persons. This legal question does not require an examination of the probative value of the evidence and begs the CA to discuss the legal definition of a real party-in-interest as applied to the undisputed facts.
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Here, the petition raised questions of law, contrary to respondent's broad assertions, which oversimplified and misunderstood some of the issues raised, such as the question as to who are the real-parties-in-interest. The said question begs us to discuss the legal definitions of "real[-]parties[-]in[-]interest" applied the undisputed facts.
To put it simply, some of the questions raised by petitioner are more geared towards the application of the law on civil procedure and civil law rather than simply identifying specific persons, which respondent seems to imply. Such legal questions obviously do not require an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented in order to come up with an answer to them.[38]
Similarly, the SRA's contention that the case is already moot after Sugar Order No. 1-B removed the contested allocation in Sugar Order Nos. 1, 1-A, and 3 is a pure question of law. Suffice it to say that the issue pertains to the interpretation of the SRA's Orders, which may be resolved without evaluating the parties' evidence. The question whether a statute or administrative regulation repealed another entails the construction of their provisions without considering facts outside the language of the law.[39]
Lastly, it bears emphasis that the parties had agreed in the course of the proceedings that the case involved no factual issues. This prompted Central Azucarera to move for a summary judgment. The RTC granted the motion considering that the SRA's opposition did not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that Central Azucarera is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[40]
All told, the CA correctly dismissed the SRA's appeal for being a wrong mode of review. The SRA should have filed a petition for review on certiorari to this Court and not an appeal to the CA. Consequently, the RTC's Order dated January 24, 2019 became final and executory. The improper appeal did not toll the reglementary period to file a petition for review on certiorari.[41] This means that the SRA has now lost its remedy against the trial court's ruling.[42]
FOOTNOTES
[27] See Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
[28] See Section 2(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
[29] See Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
[30] See Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
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